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Abstract—Cooperative transmission can greatly improve com-
munication system performance by taking advantage of the
broadcast nature of wireless channels. Most previous work on
resource allocation for cooperation transmission is based on
centralized control. In this paper, we propose two share auction
mechanisms, the SNR auction and the power auction, to distribu-
tively coordinate the resource allocation among users. We prove
the existence, uniqueness and effectiveness of the auction results.
In particular, the SNR auction leads to a fair resource allocation
among users, and the power auction achieves a solution that is
close to the efficient allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The cooperative communication concept has recently been
proposed [1], [2] as a means to take advantage of the broadcast
nature of wireless channels by using relays as virtual antennas
to provide the advantages of multiple input multiple output
(MIMO) transmission. Various cooperative protocols such as
amplify-and-forward, decode-and-forward, and estimate-and-
forward have been proposed (e.g., [1]–[4]). The work in [5]
analyzes cooperative schemes involving dirty paper coding,
while energy-efficient transmission is considered for broadcast
networks in [6]. In [7], the authors evaluate cooperative-
diversity performance when the best relay is chosen according
to the average SNR as well as the outage probability of relay
selection based on the instantaneous SNR. In [8], the authors
propose a distributed relay selection scheme that requires
limited network knowledge and is based on instantaneous
SNRs. In [9], relay section, power management, and subcarrier
assignment are investigated for multiuser OFDM networks.
In order to maximize the performance of the cooperative
transmission network, we need to consider the global chan-
nel information, including those between source-destination,
source-relay, and relay-destination. Most existing work in this
area is based on centralized control, which requires consider-
able overhead for signalling and measurement. In this paper, we
focus on designing distributed resource allocation algorithms
for cooperative networks. In particular, we want to answer the
following two questions: 1) “When to relay”, i.e., when is it
beneficial to use the relay? 2) “How to relay”, i.e., how should
the relay allocate resources among multiple competing users?
We answer these two questions by designing an auction-
based framework for cooperative resource allocation. Auctions
have recently been introduced into several areas of wireless
This research was supported by the NSF Grants ANI-03-38807, CCR-02-
05214, CNS-06-25637, CCF-0448012, and CCF-0635034, an ONR YIP grant.
communications (e.g., time slot allocation [10] and power
control [11], [12]). This paper is closely related to the auction
mechanisms proposed in [12], where the authors considered
distributed interference management in a cognitive radio net-
work without a relay. In that case, a user can only obtain a
positive transmission rate when it obtains some shared system
resource. The problem considered here is significantly different
due to the existence of the relay and the possibility of achieving
a positive transmission rate without using the relay.
We consider two network objectives here: fairness and effi-
ciency. Both might be difficult to achieve even in a centralized
fashion. This is because users’ rate increases are non-smooth
and non-concave in the relay’s transmission power, and thus the
corresponding optimization problems are non-convex. We pro-
pose two auction mechanism, the SNR auction and the power
auction, which achieve the desired network objectives in a
distributed fashion under suitable technical conditions. In both
auctions, each user decides “when to relay” based on a simple
threshold policy that is locally computable. The question of
“how to relay” is answered by a simple weighted proportional
allocation among users who use the relay. Simulation results
show that the power auction achieves an average of 95% of
the maximum rate increase in a two-user network over a wide
range of relay locations. The SNR auction achieves a fair
allocation among users but leads to a much lower total rate
increase. This reflects a fairness-efficiency tradeoff that can be
exploited by a system designer.
This paper is organized as follows. The system model and
network objectives are given in Section II. In Section III, two
share auction mechanisms are proposed, their mathematical
properties are analyzed, and mechanisms for achieving auction
results in a distributed fashion are shown. Simulation results are
discussed in Section IV and conclusions are drawn in Section
V. Due to space limitations, all proofs are omitted in this
conference version of the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND NETWORK OBJECTIVES
A. System Model
We focus our discussions on the amplify-and-forward (AF)
cooperative protocol [2] in this paper. Other cooperation proto-
cols can be analyzed in a similar fashion. The system diagrams
are shown in Fig. 1, where there are one relay node r and a
set I =(1, ..., I) of source-destination pairs. We also refer to
pair i as user i, which includes source node si and destination
node di.
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Fig. 1. System model for cooperative transmission
For each user i, the cooperative transmission consists of two
phases. In Phase 1, source si broadcasts its information to both
destination di and the relay r. The received signals Ysi,di and
Ysi,r at destination di and relay r are given by
Ysi,di =
√
PsiGsi,diXsi + ndi , (1)
and
Ysi,r =
√
PsiGsi,rXsi + nr, (2)
where Psi represents the transmit power of source si, Xsi is
the transmitted information symbol with unit energy at Phase
1 at source si, Gsi,di and Gsi,r are the channel gains from si
to destination di and relay r, respectively, and ndi and nr are
additive white Gaussian noises. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the noise level is the same for all of the links, and
is denoted by σ2. We also assume that the channels are stable
over each transmission frame.
The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at destination di in Phase 1
is
Γsi,di =
PsiGsi,di
σ2
. (3)
For amplify-and-forward cooperative transmission, in Phase
2 relay r amplifies Ysi,r and forwards it to destination di with
transmitted power Pr,di . The received signal at destination di
is
Yr,di =
√
Pr,diGr,diXr,di + n
′
di
, (4)
where
Xr,di =
Ysi,r
|Ysi,r|
(5)
is the unit-energy transmitted signal that relay r receives from
source si in Phase 1, Gr,di is the channel gain from relay r
to destination di, and n′di is the received noise at Phase 2.
Substituting (2) into (5), we can rewrite (4) as
Yr,di =
√
Pr,diGr,di(
√
PsiGsi,rXsi,di + nr)√
PsiGsi,r + σ
2
+ n′di . (6)
Using (6), the relayed SNR at destination di with the help of
relay is
Γsi,r,di =
Pr,diPsiGr,diGsi,r
σ2(Pr,diGr,di + PsiGsi,r + σ
2)
. (7)
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Fig. 2. Rate increase as a function of relay transmission power
If user i performs only the direct transmission in Phase 1
(i.e., not using the relay), it achieves a total information rate
of
Rsi,di = W log2 (1 + Γsi,di) , (8)
where W is the signal bandwidth. On the other hand, if user i
performs the transmissions in both Phases 1 and 2, it can then
achieve a total information rate at the output of maximal ratio
combining as
Rsi,r,di =
1
2
W log2 (1 + Γsi,di+Γsi,r,di) . (9)
The coefficient 1/2 is used to model the fact that cooperative
transmission will occupy one out of two phases (e.g., time,
bandwidth, code). Since Γsi,r,di is the extra SNR increase
compared with the direct transmission, we also denote
△ SNRi , Γsi,r,di . (10)
Based on (8) and (9), the rate increase that user i obtains
by cooperative transmission is
△ Ri = max {Rsi,r,di −Rsi,di , 0} , (11)
which is nonnegative since the source can always choose not
to use the relay and thereby obtain zero rate increase. △Ri is a
function of the channel gains of the source-destination, source-
relay and relay-destination links, as well as the transmission
power of the source and the relay. In particular, △Ri is a non-
decreasing, non-smooth, and non-concave function of the relay
transmission power Pr,di , as illustrated in Fig. 2.
We assume that the source transmission power Psi is fixed
for each user i, as well as the relay’s total power, P . The relay
determines the allocation of its transmission power among
users, P r , (Pr,d1 , ..., Pr,dI ), such that the total power
constraint is not violated, i.e.,
P r ∈ Pr ,
{
P r
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i
Pr,di ≤ P, Pr,di ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I
}
. (12)
B. Network Objectives: Efficiency and Fairness
We consider two different network objectives: efficiency and
fairness. An efficient power allocation P efficientr maximizes the
total rate increase of all users by solving the following problem,
max
P r∈Pr
∑
i∈I
△Ri (Pr,di) . (13)
In many cases, an efficient allocation discriminates against
users who are far away from the relay. To avoid this, we
3also consider a fair power allocation P fairr , which solves the
following problem
min
P r∈Pr
c (14)
subject to △Ri (△SNRi)
∂ (△SNRi)
= c · 1{△SNRi>0}, ∀i ∈ I.
Here 1{·} is the indicator function. The intuition behind Prob-
lem (14) is that for all users that choose to use the relay, the
corresponding △SNR should be maximized subject to the same
marginal utility among these users. This can be translated into
the minimization of the common marginal utility, due to the
concavity of △Ri in terms of △SNRi (within the appropriate
region). As an example, when the direct transmission SNR
Γsi,di is the same for all user i, the constraint in Problem (14)
means that △SNRi is the same for all users with positive rate
increase. A numerical example of such fair allocation is shown
in Section IV.
We notice that a fair allocation needs to be Pareto optimal,
i.e., no user’s rate can be increased without decreasing the rate
of another user. However, an efficient or fair allocation need not
fully utilize the resource at the relay, i.e.,
∑
i∈I Pr,di can be
less than P . This could happen, for example, when the relay is
far away from all users so that allowing the relay to transmit
half of the time will only decrease the total achievable rate.
This is very different from most previous network resource
allocation problems (including [12]), in which the network
performance is maximized only if the resource is fully utilized.
Since △Ri (Pr,di) is non-smooth and non-concave, it is well
known that Problems (13) and (14) are NP hard to solve even in
a centralized fashion. In the rest of the paper, we will propose
two auction mechanisms that can (approximately) solve these
problems under suitable technical conditions in a distributed
fashion.
III. SHARE AUCTION
An auction is a decentralized market mechanism for allo-
cating resources in an economy. An auction consists of three
key elements: 1) The good, or the resource to be allocated.
2) An auctioneer, who determines the allocation of the good
according to the auction rules. 3) A group of bidders, who want
to obtain the good from the auctioneer. The interactions and
outcome of an auction are determined by the rules, which in-
clude four components: 1) The information the auctioneer and
bidders know before the auction starts. 2) The bids submitted to
the auctioneer by the bidders. 3) The allocation determined by
the auctioneer based on the bids. 4) The payments payed by the
bidders to the auctioneer as functions of bids and allocations.
In the cooperative network considered here, it is natural to
design auction mechanisms in which the good is the relay’s
total transmit power P , the auctioneer is the relay, and the
bidders are the users. One well known auction mechanism
that achieves the efficient allocation is the VCG auction [13].
However, the VCG auction requires the relay to gather global
network information from the users, and solves I+1 nonconvex
optimization problems. This might be too complicated for
real-time implementations. To overcome the limitation of the
VCG auction, we propose two simpler share auctions, the
SNR auction and the power auction.1 The main advantages of
the two proposed auctions in this section are the simplicities
of bids and allocation. The rules of the two auctions are
described below, with the only difference being in payment
determination.
Share Auction (SNR Auction and Power Auction)
• Information: Besides the public and local information
(i.e., W,P, σ2, P si , Gsi,di), each user i also knows the
channel gains Gsi,r and Gr,di , either through measure-
ment or explicit feedback from relay r. The relay an-
nounces a positive reserve bid β > 0 and a price pi > 0
to all users before the auction starts.
• Bids: User i submits bid bi ≥ 0 to the relay.
• Allocation: The relay allocates transmit power according
to
Pr,di =
bi∑
j∈I bj + β
P. (15)
• Payments: In an SNR auction, source i pays the relay
Ci = pi △ SNRi. In a power auction, source i pays the
relay Ci = piPr,di .
A bidding profile is defined as the vector containing the
users’ bids, b = (b1, ..., bI). The bidding profile of user i’s
opponents is defined as b−i = (b1, ..., bi−1,bi+1, ..., bI), so that
b = (bi; b−i) . User i chooses bi to maximize its payoff
Ui (bi; b−i, pi) = △Ri (Pr,di (bi; b−i))− Ci (bi; b−i, pi) . (16)
For notational simplicity, we omit the dependence on β and
other system parameters.
If the reserve bid β = 0, then the resource allocation in
(15) depends only on the ratio of the bids. A bidding profile
kb (for any k > 0) leads to the same resource allocation as
b, which is not desirable in practice. That is why we need a
positive reserve bid. However, the value of β is not important
as long as it is positive. For example, if we increase β to k′β,
then users can just scale b to k′b, which leads to the same
resource allocation. For simplicity, we will choose β = 1 in
all the simulations in Section IV.
The desirable outcome of an auction is called a Nash
Equilibrium (NE), which is a bidding profile b∗ such that no
user wants to deviate unilaterally, i.e.,
Ui
(
b∗i ; b
∗
−i, pi
)
≥ Ui
(
bi; b
∗
−i, pi
)
, ∀i ∈ I, ∀bi ≥ 0. (17)
Define user i’s best response (for fixed b−i and price pi) as
Bi (b−i, pi) =
{
bi
∣∣∣∣bi = argmax
b˜i≥0
Ui
(
b˜i; b−i, pi
)}
, (18)
which in general could be a set. An NE is also a fixed point
solution of all users’ best responses. We would like to answer
the following four questions for both auctions: 1) When does
an NE exist? 2) When is the NE unique? 3) What are the
1Both auctions are similar to the ones proposed in [12]. However, due to
the unique characteristics of the relay network, especially the non-smooth and
non-concave nature of the rate increase function (e.g., Fig. 2), the analysis is
more involved and the results are very different from those in [12].
4properties of the NE? 4) How can the NE be reached in a
distributed fashion?
A. SNR Auction
Let us first determine the users’ best responses (e.g., (18))
in the SNR auction, which clearly depend on the price pi. For
each user i, there are two critical price values, pisi and pˆisi ,
where
pisi ,
W
2 ln 2
(
1 + Γsi,di+
PGr,diPsiGsi,r
(PsiGsi,r+PGr,di+σ2)σ2
) , (19)
and pˆisi is the smallest positive root of
gsi (pi) , pi (1 + Γsi,di)
−
W
2
(
log2
(
2pi ln 2
W
(1 + Γsi,di)
2
)
+
1
ln 2
)
. (20)
Both pisi and pˆisi can be calculated locally by user i.
Theorem 1: In an SNR auction, user i’s unique best re-
sponse function is
Bi (b−i, pi) = f
s
i (pi) (b−i + β) . (21)
If pˆisi > pisi , then
f si (pi) =

∞, pi ≤ pisi
(PsiGsi,r+σ
2)σ2
PGr,di
Psi
Gsi,r
W
2pi ln 2
−1−Γsi,di
−(PsiGsi,r+PGr,di+σ
2)σ2
, pi ∈ (pisi , pˆi
s
i )
0, pi ≥ pˆisi
.
(22)
If pˆisi < pisi , then f si (pi) = ∞ for pi < pˆisi and f si (pi) = 0 for
pi ≥ pˆisi .
First consider the case in which pˆisi > pisi , where Bi (b−i, pi)
is illustrated in Fig. 3. The price pˆisi determines when it is
beneficial for user i to use the relay. With any price larger
than pˆisi , user i cannot obtain a positive payoff from the auction
no matter what bid it submits, and thus it should simply use
direct transmission and achieve a rate of Rsi,di . As a result,
Bi (b−i, pi) is discontinuous at pˆisi . When pi ∈ (pisi , pˆisi ), user
i wants to participate in the auction, and its best response
depends how much other users bid (b−i). When the price is
smaller than pisi , user i becomes so aggressive that it demands
a large SNR increase that cannot be achieved even of all the
resource is allocated to it. This is reflected by an infinite bid in
(22). Now consider the case in which pˆisi < pisi . User i either
cannot obtain a positive payoff or cannot achieve the desired
SNR increase, and thus the best response is either 0 or ∞.
Combining (15) and (22), we know that if an NE exist, the
relay power allocated for user i is
Pr,di (pi) =
f si (pi)
f si (pi) + 1
P, (23)
and
∑
i∈I
fsi (pi)
fs
i
(pi)+1 < 1. The strictly inequality is due to the
positive reserve bid β.
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Next we need to find the fixed point of all users’ best
responses, i.e., the NE. A trivial case would be pˆisi ≤ pisi for all
user i, in which case there exists a unique all-zero NE b∗ = 0.
The more interesting case would be the following.
Definition 1: A network is SNR-regular if there exists at
least one user i such that pˆisi > pisi .
Theorem 2: Consider an SNR auction in an SNR-regular
network. There exists a threshold price pisth such that a unique
NE exists if pi > pisth; otherwise no NE exists.
Unlike the result in [12], the unique NE in Theorem 2 might
not be a continuous function of pi, due to the discontinuity
of the best response function as shown in Fig. 3. This has
been observed in the simulation results described in Section
IV. In particular, the unique NE could be all zero for any price
pi > pisth, even if the network is SNR-regular.
It can be seen that the “marginal utility equalization” prop-
erty of a fair allocation (i.e., the constraint in Problem (14)) is
satisfied at the NE of the SNR auction. However, there always
exists some “resource waste” since some power will never be
allocated to any user because of the positive reserve bid β.
However, by choosing a price pi larger than, but very close to,
pisth, we could reduce the resource waste to a minimum and
approximate the fair allocation. Formally, we define a reduced
feasible set parameterized by δ as
Pδr ,
{
P r
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i
Pr,di ≤ P (1− δ) , Pr,di ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I
}
.
(24)
Then we can show the following.
Theorem 3: Consider an SNR auction in an SNR-regular
network, where f si (pi) is continuous at pisth for each user i,
and greater than zero for at least one user. For any sufficiently
small δ, there exists a price pis,δ under which the unique NE
achieves the fair allocation P fairr with a reduced feasible set
Pδr .
A sufficiently small δ makes sure that we deal with a regime
in which f si (pi) is continuous for any user i. This is also
desirable in practice since we want to minimize the amount
of resource wasted.
B. Power Auction
The best response function in the power auction is nonlinear
and complicated in general. However, in the special case of low
SNR where Γsi,di and △SNRi (bi, b−i) are small for all i, i.e.,
W log2 (1 + Γsi,di+△ SNRi (bi, b−i))
≈
W
ln 2
(Γsi,di+△ SNRi (bi, b−i)) , (25)
5Bi (b−i, pi) has a linear form similar to that in (22). For each
user, we can similarly define fpi (pi), pi
p
i , pˆi
p
i and g
p
i (pi) as in
the SNR auction case. One key difference here is that the value
of pˆipi depends on the relative relationship between Gsi,di and
Gsi,r. If Gsi,di > Gsi,r, then pˆi
p
i = 0 and user i never uses
the relay. If Gsi,di < Gsi,r, then pˆi
p
i is the smallest positive
root of gpi (pi). Details are omitted due to space limitations.
In terms of the existence, uniqueness and properties of the
NE, we have the following.
Definition 2: A network is power-regular if pˆipi > pipi for at
least one user i.
Theorem 4: Consider a power auction in a power-regular
network with low SNR. There exists a threshold price pipth > 0
such that a unique NE exists if pi > pipth; otherwise no NE
exists.
Theorem 5: Consider a power auction in a power-regular
network with low SNR, where fpi (pi) is continuous at pi
p
th for
each user i, and greater than zero for at least one user. For
any sufficiently small δ, there exists a price pip,δ under which
the unique NE achieves the efficient allocation P efficientr with a
reduced feasible set Pδr .
C. Distributed Iterative Best Response Updates
The last question we want to answer is how the NE can
be reached in a distributed fashion. Consider the SNR auction
as an example. It is clear that the best response function in
(22) can be calculated in a distributed fashion with limited
information feedback from the relay. However, each user does
not have enough information to calculate the best response of
other users, which prevents it from directly calculating the NE.
Nevertheless, the NE can be achieved in a distributed fashion
if we allow the users to iteratively submit their bids based on
best response functions.
Suppose users update their bids b (t) at time t according to
the best response functions as in (21), based on other users’
bids b (t− 1) in the previous time t− 1, i.e.,
b (t) = F s (pi) b (t− 1) + f s (pi) β, (26)
where both b (t) and b (t− 1) are column vectors, F s (pi) is
an I-by-I matrix whose (i, j)th component equals f si (pi), and
fs (pi) = [f s1 (pi) , ..., f
s
I (pi)]
′
.
Theorem 6: If there exists a unique nonzero NE in the
SNR auction, the best response updates in (26) globally and
geometrically converge to the NE from any positive b (0).
Similar convergence results can be proved for the power
auction.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
We first simulate various auction mechanisms for a two-
user network. As shown in Fig. 4, the locations of the two
sources (s1 and s2) and two destinations (d1 and d2) are fixed at
(200m,-25m), (0m,25m), (0m,-25m), and (200m,25m). We fix
the x coordinate of the relay node r at 80m and its y coordinate
varies within the range [-200m,200m]. In the simulation, the
relay moves along a line. The propagation loss factor is set to
4, and the channel gains are distance based (i.e., time-varying
y (m)
1
s 2
d 1
d 2
r
(200,25)
(0,−25) (200,−25)
(0,25)
Relay Trajectory
(80,−200)
(80,200)
x (m)
s
Fig. 4. A two-user cooperative network
fading is not considered here). The transmit power between a
source and its destination is Psi = 0.01W for all user i, the
noise level is σ2 = 10−11W, and the bandwidth is W = 1MHz.
The total power of the relay node is set to P = 0.1W.
In Fig. 5, we show the total rate increases achieved by
two users in three auctions. The VCG auction achieves the
efficient allocation by solving three non-convex optimization
problems by the relay. For both the SNR auction and the
power auction, the resource allocation depends on the choice
of price pi (but is independent of the reserve bid β). Every
point on the curve represents an allocation in which the price
is adjusted so that the total resource allocated to both users
is more than 0.99P (unless this is not possible). The power
auction achieves performance very close to that of the VCG
auction. At those locations where the VCG auction achieves
a positive rate increase, the power auction achieves a rate
increase with an average of 95% of that achieved by the VCG
auction. The SNR auction achieves less total rate increases but
leads to fair resource allocations when both users use the relay
(as can be seen in Fig. 6).
In Fig. 6, we show the individual rate increases of both users
in the SNR auction and the power auction. The individual
rate increases in the VCG auction are similar to that of the
power auction and thus are not shown here. First consider the
power auction. Since the relay movement trajectory is relatively
closer to source s2 than to source s1, user 2 achieves an overall
better performance compared with user 1. In particular, user 2
achieves a peak rate increase of 1.35 bits/Hz when the relay is
at location 25m (y-axis), compared with the peak rate increase
of 0.56 bits/Hz achieved by user 1 when relay is at location
-25m. Things are very different in an SNR auction, where
the resource allocation is fair. In particular, since the distance
between a source and its destination is the same for both
users in our simulation, both users achieve the same positive
rate increases when they both use the relay. This is the case
when the relay is between locations -60m and 10m. At other
locations, users just choose not to use the relay since they
cannot both get equal rate increases while obtaining a positive
payoff. This shows the tradeoff between efficiency and fairness.
Next, we consider the case in which there are multiple
users in the network. To be specific, there are 20 users in
the network, with their source nodes and destination nodes
randomly and uniformly located within the square field that
has the same range of [-150m,150m] on both the x-axis and
the y-axis. A single relay is fixed at the location (0m,0m). The
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Fig. 6. Individual rate increases vs. relay location (y-axis) for the SNR auction
and the power auction.
total transmission power P of the relay is varied between 0.04
W and 1 W. Figs. 7 and 8 show the corresponding simulation
results. Each point in the figures represents results averaged
over 100 randomly generated network topologies. With an
increasing amount of resource at the relay node, the total
network rate increase improves in both auctions (as seen in
Fig. 7), and the power auction achieves higher rate increase
than the SNR auction. Fig. 8 shows the variance of the rate
increase (among the users with positive rate increase), and it is
clear that the SNR auction achieves a fair resource allocation
as indicated by the almost zero variance in all cases.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Cooperative transmission can greatly improve communica-
tion system performance by taking advantage of the broadcast
nature of wireless channels and cooperation among users. In
this paper, we have proposed two share auction mechanisms,
the SNR auction and the power auction, to distributively
coordinate the relay power allocation among users. We have
proven the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
in both auctions. Under suitable conditions, the SNR auction
achieves the fair allocation, while the power auction achieves
the efficient allocation. Simulations results for both two-user
and multiple-user networks have been used to demonstrate
the effectiveness of the auction mechanisms. In particular, the
power auction achieves an average of 95% of the maximum rate
in the two-user case under a wide range of relay locations, and
the SNR auction leads to a performance improvement having
small variation among users.
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Fig. 7. Total network rate increase vs. relay power.
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